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“D” is for Dilly-dally?
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Introduction

“Sagacious” advice must be both logical and persistent. When available, empirical evidence must also support it. Like most advice, “Stop dilly-dallying!” has passed the first
two of these tests. Dilly-dallying indeed steals time, and advice against it is persistent
among parents and professors. However, because of our inability to accurately measure
the degree to which procrastinators dilly-dally, we have, until recently, been precluded
from empirically testing the advice. Thanks to new internet-based course-management
tools, measuring procrastination among college students has become possible. We report
findings from one such system, Aplia (www.aplia.com).1 All else equal, early starters
and front-loaders score higher on their assignments, i.e., there is a cost associated with
procrastination.2
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Aplia and Measures of Procrastination

Students registered with Aplia at the beginning of the semester to obtain nine weekly
practice (i.e., ungraded) and graded assignments each.3 The graded assignments for each
topic were automatically graded at the end of the week in which they were due. Students
were able to access the problems at any time during the week, in any order, and as many
times as desired prior to the grading deadline. Aplia kept track of the dates and times that
students first accessed each problem.
Definitions and summary statistics for our data are provided in Table 1. The first four
variables were compiled by Aplia, the next two (GPA and CREDITS) are from official
student transcripts, and the remaining five were obtained via an end-of-semester survey.4
START and SKEW distinguish two types of procrastinators. START measures the time
1

difference (in days) between the an assignment’s grading deadline and when the student
first accessed the assignment to answer a question. Students with relatively high (low)
START values are considered early-(late-)starters. SKEW measures skewness in the distribution of a student’s time differences (in minutes) between the grading deadline and
when the student first accessed each question contained in a given assignment. It represents the degree to which a student front-loads or back-loads their start times across all
questions of a given assignment. Students with negative (positive) SKEWs are considered front-(back-)loaders.5
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Empirical Model and Results

We begin by testing for fixed and random effects using a standard panel-data model
(Greene, 2003), henceforth “standard model”:
yjk = x0jk β + vjk

j = 1, . . . , J,

k = 1, . . . , K

(1)

where yjk is the SCORE for student j on assignment k, x0jk a vector of assignment-variant
and assignment-invariant explanatory variables from Table 1, and β a corresponding coefficient vector. The expression for vjk depends on whether pooled OLS, fixed, or random
effects are assumed. For pooled OLS, vjk = α+εjk , where α is a common intercept term
across all students and assignments and εjk an i.i.d. error term with constant variance.
For fixed effects (FE), vjk = αj + εjk , where αj is a student-specific intercept term. For
random effects (RE), vjk = α + uj + εjk , where uj is a student-specific random element,
similar to εjk , except that for each student a single draw enters the regression identically
for each assignment.
Since START may be endogeneously determined, we employ Baltagi’s (2001) method
to test for bias. Our focus on START as a potential endogeneous covariate, rather than
2

SKEW, is based on separate panel regressions run to explain START and SKEW. These
models indicate that variation in START across students and assignments can be explained by several of the explanatory variables contained in (1), while variation in SKEW
cannot. Following Baltagi (2001), an instrumental-variables model (IV) adjusts the standard model:
0
yjk = wjk
γ + x0jk β + vjk

j = 1, . . . , J,

k = 1, . . . , K

(2)

0
where x0jk now represents a vector of exogenously determined explanatory variables; wjk

a vector of endogenously determined explanatory variables assumed to be correlated with
εjk (in our case START); and γ a corresponding coefficient vector. Let the dimension
for γ be 1 × Iw (in our case Iw = 1), and assume a 1 × Iz vector of observations on Iz
instruments in z0jk (in our case the instruments are CREDITS, CHILD, S1, and S2). The
order condition Iz ≥ Iw is therefore satisfied, and (2) can be estimated with z0jk in place
0 .
of wjk

Results for various specifications of the standard and IV models are presented in Table 2.6 Based on reported significance levels for the Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM and
Hausman (1978) χ2 specification tests for the standard model, and on the Hausman test
for the IV model, we focus on results for the RE models - RE and RE(IV).7 Since the results for these two models are qualitatively similar, we base the following interpretations
on the RE(IV) model.
First, note that early-starters fare better than late-starters. For each day that a student
accesses an assignment before the deadline, their score increases by approximately 2.7
percentage points, all else equal. Therefore, the greatest possible difference in score between early and late starters, ceteris paribus, is approximately 14 percentage points, or
a full grade and a half per assignment. This could potentially have a large impact on a
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student’s overall course grade if homework assignments are a relatively large determinant
of the overall course grade (in this course, homework scores accounted for 35 percent of
the total grade). Front-loaders add an average of 1.85 percentage points to a given assignment. Procrastinators, both late-starters and back-loaders, therefore tend to perform
worse on graded assignments than their non-dilly-dallying counterparts.8,9
Recent work offers compelling interpretations of both rational and irrational procrastination. Fischer (2001) models leisure as a rational exhaustible resource problem.
Akerlof (1991) depicts procrastination as a response to misperceived “salience costs”
that inflate the cost of current opportunities and reduce the cost of procrastinating on
future tasks. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) differentiate between naı̈ve and sophisticated procrastinators and introduce a menu of tasks on which an individual might choose
to procrastinate. A common implication is that the relationship between the number of
tasks facing the individual and the degree to which he procrastinates on any given task is
(positively) monotonic. We tested this “monotonic-procrastination” hypothesis for latestarting students and found that enrolling for an additional credit hour induces an increase
in start time by 0.12 days. This suggests a negative monotonic relationship between the
number of tasks a student undertakes at school and late-starting procrastination.10
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Conclusions

Using information from online assignments, we find evidence suggesting that non-procrastinators obtain higher scores than their dilly-dallying counterparts. This is true for both
early-starters and front-loaders, although the magnitude of the early-starting effect on
student performance is larger and more statistically significant. Taken together, these
results suggest that the admonishment “Stop dilly-dallying!” is indeed sage advice dilly-dallying comes with a cost. With respect to informing policy, our results suggest
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that universities should not necessarily be too concerned about the effects of credit-hour
loads on student procrastination habits. Although the use of internet-based assignments
may still be considered pedagogically non-traditional, the course in thus study followed
a traditional lecture format with reliance on homework assignments and in-class examinations to evaluate student performance, suggesting that our estimates of the effects of
procrastination are generalizable to other economics and non-economics courses.
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Table 1: Variable Definitions
Variable
SCORE
PRACTICE
START
SKEW
GPA
CREDITS
GENDER
HRSWORK
CHILD
S1
S2

Description
Percentage correct per graded assignment.
1 = attempted practice assignment, 0 otherwise.
Time difference (in days) between the grading
deadline and first assignment access.
Skewness (in minutes).
Grade point average (4.00 scale).
Total credits enrolled.
1 = male, 0 = female.
Total number of hours worked per week at
wage-paying job.
1 = at least one child under the age of 18 at
home, 0 otherwise.
1 = assignment occurred in first third of
semester, 0 otherwise.
1 = assignment occurred in second third of
semester, 0 otherwise.

Mean (SD)*
69.89 (31.43)
0.57 (0.50)
2.13 (2.46)
0.23 (1.08)
3.39 (0.35)
11.78 (3.80)
0.70 (0.46)
18.27 (15.88)
0.13 (0.34)
0.33 (0.47)
0.33 (0.47)

* Overall means (Mean) and associated standard deviations (SDs). Sample size for each
variable is 207, except for GPA, CREDITS, and HRSWORK, which are 198 each.
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Table 2: Effect of Procrastination on Score
Explanatory Variables
CONSTANT
PRACTICE
START
SKEW
GPA
CREDITS
HRSWORK
CHILD
S1
S2
F (k, n − k)
Wald χ2 (k = 7)
Adjusted R2
LM χ2
Hausman χ2

OLS
16.82
(14.24)
3.70
(2.83)
2.23***
(0.61)
-1.62
(1.18)
19.82***
(3.92)
-0.24
(0.38)
-0.43***
(0.10)
-1.02
(4.76)
1.02
(3.64)
-2.87
(3.42)
13.34***

Fixed Effects (FE)a
70.39***
(2.79)
7.87***
(3.03)
1.81***
(0.55)
-1.78*
(1.07)

0.39

0.09

0.40
(3.16)
-3.06
(2.93)
5.37***

Random Effects (RE)
13.32
(22.71)
6.31**
(3.05)
2.14***
(0.60)
-1.74
(1.14)
20.56***
(6.42)
-0.23
(0.59)
-0.45***
(0.15)
-9.06
(7.34)
0.59
(3.42)
-3.06
(3.19)

RE(IV)
7.10
(21.67)
7.14**
(2.97)
2.65***
(1.08)
-1.85*
(1.12)
20.81***
(6.29)

63.77***
0.42
8.15***

49.68***
0.39

2.03

-0.54***
(0.13)

1.14

Standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations is 175 for each regression, except for FE, which is
184. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level.
a

Standard errors corrected using Cornwell, et al.’s (1992) method.
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Notes
1. The closest studies to ours concerning the factors influencing student performance in
economics are Johnson et al. (2002) and Krohn and O’Connor (2004), but these deal
with measures of effort rather than delay.
2. What a professor perceives as dilly-dallying may instead be the optimal outcome of
the student’s time-allocation problem. In this case, the cost incurred is that of optimal
rather than abject dilly-dallying. To distinguish empirically between the two would
require an underlying general equilibrium model of student choice.
3. The assignments were advanced ‘workouts’ in Bergstrom and Varian (2003). The
course text was Varian (2003). Twenty-three students completed the assignments. The
course began with 25 students, thus it is unlikely that our data suffers from missing
data, as noted in Becker and Power (2001).
4. HRSWORK is self-reported and thus may be subject to the “Lake Wobegon Effect”
(Maxwell and Lopus, 1994). However, the typical USU student is a member of the
LDS Church, which encourages its members to begin their married lives and careers
earlier than the national average. We also compared self-reported GPA and CREDITS
with official values from transcripts. Mean values for official and self-reported GPAs
were 3.34 and 3.37, respectively, not statistically significantly different at the 95 percent level. The official and self-reported means for CREDITS were 14.25 and 12.05,
respectively. This under-reporting of credit hours was significant at the 95 percent
level.
5. This measure cannot account for the relative difficulty of questions and thus may overstate the loading behavior of some students (for those who backloaded their effort by
having started the more difficult questions first).
6. We tested the standard model for heteroskedasticity and within-panel (AR1) autocor-
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relation using feasible GLS (Greene, 2003). Results correcting for these possible error structures were qualitatively similar to those without the corrections, which are
reported below. Alternative regressions were considered with a normalized score to
control for difficulty across assignments, but results were again qualitatively similar.
Panels are unbalanced due to a few missing values for the dependent variable, SCORE.
Missing values occurred when students chose not to attempt some of the graded assignments.
7. For the standard model, the LM test rejects the pooled OLS model in favor of random
effects, and the Hausman χ2 test rejects FE in favor of RE. For the IV model, the
Hausman χ2 test similarly rejects FE in favor of RE.
8. Our results also suggest that, all else equal, students who completed practice assignments and had higher GPAs similarly performed better. Students who worked longer
hours outside of school performed worse. The large coefficient for GPA could reflect
the fact that the Aplia assignments are considered “advanced” by Bergstrom and Varian (2003). Or, GPA could be proxying for other unmeasured determinants of overall
student capability.
9. To test whether procrastination has a negative effect on exam scores, we also ran a simple OLS regression of total exam points on GPA, GENDER, CREDITS, HRSWORK,
and the averages of SKEW and START across the nine assignments. GPA had a strong
positive effect, as did CREDITS. HRSWORK had a negative effect. However, averaged SKEW and START had no statistical effect. Thus, procrastination on homework
assignments does not necessarily translate into poorer performance on exams.
10. In the case of front-/back-loaders, we find no evidence that an additional credit hour
or an additional hour worked induces more back-loading. However, students did backload their effort most during the middle of the semester. This could reflect conventional wisdom that students start the semester full of enthusiasm and finish in a state of
11

trauma, which reduces their penchant for backloading. Results are available from the
authors.
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